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DICKINSON LAW REVIEW
THE MARRIAGE OF FIRST COUSINS DOMICILED
IN PENNSYLVANIA
The general rule is that each state, in matters of the contol and regulation
of marriage, is sovereign and has the right to determine the marital status of its
citizens under its own laws.' Marriage between first cousins was long considered
valid under Pennsylvania common law, but today, if A and B, first cousins domi-
ciled in Pennsylvania want to marry, they are confronted by the Act of 1901, P.
L. 597 which reads in part:
Section 1. .. That from and after the first day of January, Anno Domini
one thousand nine hundred and two, it shall be unlawful for
any male person and female person, who are of kin of the degree
of first cousins, to be joined in marriage.
Section 2. All marriages contracted in violation of the provisions of the
first section of this act are hereby declared void.
Two situations will be considered: (1) The effect of a marriage performed
in Pennsylvania in violation of the act, and (2) the status of a marriage celebrated
by Pennsylvania first cousin domiciliaries in a state where it is lawful.
Assume that A and B do marry in Pennsylvania. The statute in question ex-
pressly provides in section 2 that a marriage contracted in violation of the act
shall be declared void. A void marriage is no marriage at all. There is no penalty
attached to a violation of the act. Does all this mean that A and B may later, by
their own act, separate without subsequent legal liability?2 The answer is in the
negative.
Void as used in the statute does not mean void at all, but has been interpreted
to mean voidable.3 The effect is that a marriage between first cousins contracted
in Pennsylvania is, by the mere violation of the act, grounds for divorce. It does
not matter that the party suing is not "an injured and innocent spouse." 4
The problem becomes more complicated if A and B are married in a state
where such a contract is lawful. In the case of Scbofield v. SchofieWd the parties
1 55 c.s. 811.
2 "The so-called void marriage, being in fact no legal relation, dose not require a judicial
decree of nullity in order that the parties may be competent to contract in marriage. Neverthe.
less, in such cases the courts will make a decree on proper application and proof, as well as for
the sake of the good order of society as for the quiet and relief of the injured party and the ad.
justment of property interests." 55 C.J.S. 921.
9 McClain v. McClain, 40 Pa. Super. 248, (1909). Voidable; i.e., a matter for divorce, re-
quiring a judicial decree.
4 McClain v. McClain, 40 Pa. Super. 248, (1909).
6 Schofield v. Schofield, 51 Pa. Super. 564, (1912).
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were first cousins domiciled in Pennsylvania. Knowing that they could not be
married lawfully in Pennsylvania, they went to Delaware where they could be
married lawfully and performed the contract there. Thereafter they returned to
Pennsylvania to live. Some time later, after two children had been born, W sued
H for divorce, alleging that she and H were of "kin of the degree of first cousins,"
and that she was entitled to a divorce under the statute of 1901. The divorce was
denied. The rule from the case appears to be that first cousins domiciled in Penn-
sylvania can circumvent the statute of 1901, P. L. 597, merely by having the marri-
age performed in a state where it can be celebrated lawfully.
Should this be considered an absolute rule, an automatic consequence of the
application of Pennsylvania conflict of laws rules? This writer believes that it
should not be given that construction. An analysis of the various factors that must
be determined before any conclusion can be drawn will reveal the fallacy of ac-
cepting the rule as unqualified.
The general rule in the field of conflict of laws is that the validity of a
marriage is to be decided by the law of the place where it is contracted. There
are two definite exceptions to that rule, and if a marriage between first cousins
domiciled in Pennsylvania is to be included in either exception, the Pennsylvania
courts will not recognize the foreign law:
(1) If the marriage is incestuous, polygamous, or otherwise contrary to the
laws of nature,6 or
(2) If it is obnoxious to the policy embodied in the Pennsylvania law.7
The question of polygamy will not be considered in this discussion. Is the
relationship between A and B, then, incestuous or otherwise contrary to the laws
of nature? There is no statute in Pennsylvania specifically designating marriage
between first cousins as incestuous, or which describes marriage between first
cousins as contrary to the laws of nature. Questionable recourse may be had to
the doctrine of Christianity.8 That doctrine is based on the concept of an All-
Powerful Mind described indiscriminately as God or Nature. "This law of nature
being co-eval with mankind and dictated by God himself, is, of course, superior
in obligation to any other. It is binding over all the globe in all countries, and
at all times. .. "
6 Schofield v. Schofield, 51 Pa. Super. 564, (1912); Commonwealth v. Custer, 145 Pa.
Super. 535, 21 A. 2d 524, (1941); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 132.
7 Schofield v. Schofield, 51 Pa. Super. 564, (1912); Commonwealth v. Custer, 145 Pa.
Super. 535, 21 A. 2d 524, (1941); RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 134.
8 "That general body of rules to which it is supposed that human conduct ought to con-
form, even though not enforced by the direct action of the State,-rules derived from the Law
of Nature or the general code of morality." CARTER, LAW; ITS ORIGIN, GROWTH AND
FJNCTION, p. 6.
9 BLACKSTONE, book i., p. 41.
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The glaring defect in the doctrine of Christianity or Law of Nature in the
matter of first cousin marriages is that it is in this particular too uncertain to sup-
port a definite conclusion. The states themselves offer no solution in applying
this Law of Nature, as the status of a marriage of first cousins has never been uni-
versally designated incestuous or not-incestuous or otherwise contrary to the laws
of nature.
Pennsylvania deliberately chose, in the Act of 1860, P. L. 382, to enumerate
such degrees of relationship as it considered consanguinous and outrageous to
general morality. That act was incorporated into the Penal Code of 1939 which
made persons who married within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity guilty
of incest. Yet, neither in the Act of 1860 nor in the act as incorporated into the
Penal Code was there any mention made of the relationship of first cousins.
Admittedly, first cousins are closely related, but the. Pennsylvania legislature
has distinguished their status from that of marriages which it considers immoral.
The last word in case decision is that marriage between first cousins has never
been considered incestuous or contrary to the laws of nature in PennsylvaniaJla
One may notice that the statute of 1901 which made it unlawful for first
cousins to be joined in marriage has been considered in connection with the sta-
tute of 1815, P. L. 150 in holding that first cousin marriages are merely voidable,"I
although the statute of 1815 expressly states that it applies only to "marriages
within the degree of consanguinity or affinity."' 2 Any inference therefrom that
such a contract is incestuous has been overcome by case decision and, the declara-
tion of the Penal Code of 1939. Relationship, therefore, as it is used in granting
a divorce where the parties are Pennsylvania domiciliaries of "kin of the degree
of first cousins" and who contracted the marriage in Pennsylvania, is used in
its broad sense of which consanguinity and affinity are but segregated elements.
The fact that the policy of the statute of 1901 must be determined before
foreign law will or will not be applied presents a serious obstacle. A strong public
policy will prevent recognition of a marriage celebrated between Pennsylvania
domiciliaries although it was lawful where contracted. No rule has ever been laid
down as to the exact circumstances under which a particular marriage will be held
positively to be against public policy. The term itself is almost indefinable, and
its strength appears to rest on the convictions of public opinion prevalent at
10 Schofield v. Schofield, 51 Pa. Super. 564, (1912).
11 McClain v. McClain, 40 Pa. Super. 248, (1909).
12 Act of 1815, P.L. 150: "All marriages within the degree of consanguinity or affinity,
according to the table established by law, are hereby declared void to all intents and purposes,
and it shall and may be lawful for the court of common pleas of this Commonwealth, or any
of them, to grant divorce from the bonds of matrimony in such cases; . . ." See also the Act
of 1929, P.L. 1237: "When a marriage has been heretofore or shall hereafter be, contracted and
celebrated between two persons within the prohibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity, accord-
ing to the tables established by law, it shall be lawful for either of said parties to obtain a
divorce from the bond of matrimony in the manner hereinafter provided."
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a given time." As an example of the type of marriage which Pennsylvania has
deemed offensive to public policy, reference may be had to the case of Stull's
Estate. 14 H, divorced on the grounds of adultery, went with his paramour to Mary-
land where they were married, Although valid in Maryland, the marriage was
banned by statute in Pennsylvania. It was held that the incapacity of the parties
to marry extended outside of Pennsylvania and the Maryland law would not
be recognized. It offended the prevailing sense of good morals of their domicile.
The case of Schofield v. Schofield, supra, held that the policy of the pro-
hibitory statute of 1901 was to discourage marriages between first cousins, not be-
cause they are immoral or injurious to the public, but as a matter of expediency.
From this decision it would seem that such a marriage is not repugnant to the
public policy of Pennsylvania. However, the writer contends that this interpreta-
tion of policy should not be held absolute. The reason is this: children were in-
volved in that case. Where final decision rests on the application of policy, all
the facts and circumstances of the case are weighed. The matter of children is of
strong public concern. Children should be protected. Consequently, the desire to
shield them may in itself prove so strong as to outweigh the primary policy of
a statute. Thus, it may be the strong public policy involved in the facts of the case
itself rather than the policy decreed in the statute that leads a court to determine
whether or not a marriage will be held valid.
Contrast the case of Schofield v. Schofield with the case of Stull's Estate.
supra. Although the latter case did not concern first cousins, it should be noted
that the reason the marriage was held invalid was because it was against "the
prevailing sense of good morals in their domicile." Children were not involved.
It may well be that if children had been involved, that factor alone would have
proven of such strong policy that it would have provided a basis on which to up-
hold the marriage. Conversely, if children had not been present in the case of
Schofield v. Schofield, the marriage there might have been declared unlawful,
In conclusion, it may be said that the Act of 1901, P. L. 597 prohibits the
making of the marriage contract between first cousins in Pennsylvania. Whether
or not the status of such a marriage will be held lawful in contracted lawfully
in a foreign state depends not on the policy of the statute, but on the policy of
the statute as affected by the facts of the particular case.
WALTER R. HARWOOD
1 A. V. Dicey, LAW AND OPINION IN ENGLAND, p. 14.
14 Stull's Estate, 183 Pa. 625, 39 A. 16, (1898).
